The Institutional Framework as a competitiveness factor in Latin America

Authors

Abstract

This document objective is to analyze the performance of selected Latin American countries in relation to their institutional framework, that is to say their legal systems, rules, norms and other regulatory provisions. These elements define, to large extent, the functioning and performance of markets linked to good and services, labor and financial systems. Specifically, by means of a factorial analysis along with a clustering process, the most significant explanatory variables on the trend and behavior of six out of 12 pillars for competitiveness as stated by the World Economic Forum have been identified and, likewise, the countries have been classified into a homogenous regional subgroups according to their performance.

Keywords:

institutions, competitiveness, evaluation, World Competitiveness Report

Author Biographies

Luis Felipe Llanos Reynoso, chool of Economics and Business. Anahuac University

Professor and Researcher at the School of Economics and Business. Anahuac University, Mexico

Alfonso Brown del Rivero, School of Economics and Business, Anahuac University

Professor - Researcher at the School of Economics and Business, Anahuac University, Mexico

Hugo Javier Fuentes Castro, School of Social Sciences and Government. Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education

Professor and Researcher at the School of Social Sciences and Government. Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education, Mexico

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